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TAX COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CORPORATIONS-FRANCHISE TA.-
The relator, formerly a Delaware corporation, purchased for $1,500,-
000 on July 1, 1919, the majority of the assets of the "Salisbury Axle
Co., Inc.," a corporation organized under the laws of the state of
New York. The purchase included all of the real and personal prop-
erty used by the vendor corporation in its ordinary business of manu-
facturing axles, and excluded certain special materials and equipment
valued at about $495,000. In June of 1920, the vendee corporation
made a franchise tax report under Article 9-A of the Tax Law and
denied having either directly or indirectly acquired by merger, con-
solidation or purchase, the major part of the assets or of the fran-
chises of any other corporation or corporations since January 1, 1917.
Subsequently, however, the tax commission ascertained that this was
erroneous and made a corrected assessment against the relator, pur-
suant to Section 214-A of the Tax Law, which was based on the
entire income of both corporations for the calendar year of 1919.
The relator contended (1) that Section 214-A, Tax Law, is violative
of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, in that a purchaser acquiring 51% of the assets of
another corporation would be required to pay as much tax as the
purchaser of the entire business. (2) If the statute is held to be
constitutional, it should be construed so as to tax the purchasing cor-
poration only on such part of the income of the vendor corporation
as was derived from the assets transferred to the purchaser. Held,
the determination of the State Tax Commission affirmed. People
ex rel. Salisbury Axle Co. v. Lynch, 259 N. Y. 228, 181 N. E. 460
(1932).
The states in the exercise of their taxing power are subject to
the requirements of the due process and the equal protection clause
of the 14th Amendment, but that Amendment imposes no iron rule of
equality prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to
schemes of taxation.' The rule is generally stated to be that a classi-
fication resting upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced are treated alike, is not repugnant to the
Federal Constitution.2 In order to render a classification illegal, the
I Giozza v. Tierman, 148 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 721 (1893); Ohio Oil Co.
v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146, 50 Sup. Ct. 310 (1930). Note (1931) 45 HARv. L.
REv. 33 at 50: "It is settled that mere inequalities or exemptions in state taxa-
tion are not forbidden by the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment;
that the power of the state to make any reasonable classification of property,
occupations, persons or corporations for purposes of taxation is not abridged
thereby; and that the Amendment forbids mere inequality which is the result
of clearly arbitrary action and, particularly, of action attributable to hostile
discrimination against particular persons or classes."
'Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 33 Sup. Ct. 66
(1912); La Coste v. Dept. of Conservation of the State of Louisiana, 263
U. S. 545, 44 Sup. Ct. 186 (1924); Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146,
50 Sup. Ct. 310 (1930). These cases are authority for the proposition that
legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application,
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situation discriminated against must be shown to be precisely the
same as that included in the class which is shown to be favored.3
Whatever inequality of burden results from the statute in question
comes from the election of certain taxpayers to avail themselves of
privileges offered to all, and not an arbitrary classification by the
legislature. 4  From the holdings of the courts in previous decisions
relating to similar statutes, it seems clear that Section 214-A of the
Tax Law bears a real and reasonable relation to the privilege granted,
is not unnecessarily burdensome, and is not violative of the Federal
Constitution. 5
In adjudicating the instant case, the Court would not give a false
interpretation to the statute which is clear and unequivocal. 6 The
judiciary will not construe a statute so as to give to it a meaning
neither intended nor warranted by the language used.7 Once again,
the Court, in its liberal construction of the equality clause of the
14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution, gives to the state great
power in its constitutional right of taxation.
A.H.
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-CALIFORNIA ESTATE TAX AS A DEDUC-
TION.-On April 25, 1917, Rosa Von Zimmerman, an enemy alien,
died testate. Her will was probated and taxes paid to the Federal
and State Governments. The Alien Property Custodian, under act
of Congress, served notice on the executors to surrender the estate to
him and it was in his hands until the passage of the Winslow Act.'
This action was brought by Kombst and other residuary legatees
joined with the Alien Property Custodian who allege that the tax
paid to the state of California is a deductible item for computation
of Federal Estate Tax. As the action was brought eight years after
does not violate the provision if, within the sphere of its operation, it affects
alike all persons similarly situated. See also 1 COOLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATION
(1924) §§249, 357, 358.
'Bradley & Co. v. City of Richmond, 110 Va. 521, 66 S. E. 872 (1910).
'Merchants and Manufacturers Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461, 17
Sup. Ct. 829 (1897).
'Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. 45
(1920) ; People ex rel. Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton v. State Tax Commission, 232
N. Y. 42, 133 N. E. 122, 266 U. S. 271, 45 Sup. Ct. 82 (1924) ; National Com-
pany v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 277 U. S. 413, 48 Sup. Ct. 534
(1928).
'Wiley v. Solvay Process Co.. 215 N. Y. 584, 109 N. E. 606 (1915);
Cooper-Snell Co. v. State, 230 N. Y. 249, 129 N. E. 893 (1921), holds that a
statute should be read according to the natural and obvious import of the lan-
guage used without resorting to a subtle or forced construction either limiting
or extending the effect.
Ibid.
142 STAT. 1511, c. 285, March 4, 1923.
